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I.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal is about the amount of principal and interest due on an award of restitution
after Appellant Compeer Financial FLCA fka AgStar Financial Services, ACA ("Compeer")
collected pursuant to an order that this Court later reversed. Compeer replies to three issues
raised in Respondents' (collectively, "Gordon Paving's") brief.
First, the district court erred in granting Gordon Paving the gross proceeds of the
personal property auction even though Compeer was only enriched by the net proceeds. Because
Compeer did not realize the amounts it spent on preparing the collateral for auction and on
auctioneer fees, it was never unjustly enriched by those amounts. And, Compeer's execution was
not wrongful, but was rather done in pursuit of a final judgment in a case in which Gordon
Paving had posted no bond. Gordon Paving should not receive the gross proceeds of an
execution sale that it could have stayed.
Second, contrary to Gordon Paving's statement, the district court did not find that
Compeer failed to prove the Masters Auction Service fees that were directly deducted from its
auction proceeds check-the court held only that Compeer was not legally entitled to an offset
for those fees. This is an incorrect legal holding. At the very least, therefore, Compeer should
receive an offset for the Masters Auction Service fees that were deducted from the check.
Third, Gordon Paving should not profit from the trial delay that it caused. Gordon Paving
is not entitled to the time-value of money for this period because it willingly chose to put off trial
for the chance to present evidence on fair market value damages. It represented that Compeer
would not be prejudiced for the delay. Throughout this time, the claim remained unliquidated
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from Compeer's perspective, as Gordon Paving continued to maintain its request for legal
damages. Compeer should not be required to pay for Gordon Paving's delay of the trial while
Compeer waited for a legal determination regarding whether it would be required to pay for legal
damages or only restitution.
For the reasons stated in Compeer's briefing, Compeer requests that this Court vacate the
judgment and direct the district court to amend the judgment in accordance with its arguments
herein.

II.
A.

REPLY ARGUMENT

Compeer Was Not Unjustly Enriched by the Amount of Auction Expenses.
Although an award of restitution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the district court

must still properly apply the law to the dispute. Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703,
711, 52 P.3d 848, 856 (2002) (An element of the abuse of discretion test is "whether the trial
court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable
to the specific choices available to it.") Here, the district court abused its discretion because it
acted contrary to law in awarding Gordon Paving restitution in the amount of the gross proceeds
of the auction.
Compeer prevails whether its position is characterized as an argument regarding the

prima facie claim of unjust enrichment or as a defense to that claim. The Restatement provides
that a claim for restitution on a reversed judgment sounds in unjust enrichment: "A transfer or
taking of property, in compliance with or otherwise in consequence of a judgment that is
subsequently reversed or avoided, gives the disadvantaged party a claim in restitution as
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necessary to avoid unjust enrichment." Restatement (Third) on Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment ("Restatement") § 18 (emphasis added). Under Idaho law, the elements of unjust
enrichment are: "(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment
to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho
105, 109, 408 P.3d 465, 469 (2017) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Compeer simply was not unjustly enriched by the amounts it spent on auctioneer fees and
on preparing the collateral for auction, as it never "appreciated" these amounts. The district court
should have awarded only net proceeds of the auction, reducing the award of restitution by the
amount of the auction expenses ($43,747.43) and collateral preparation expenses ($32,025.12).

See R. at 455-57. Instead, the district court required Compeer to pay more than the benefit it
realized. Under the district court's judgment, Compeer is now required to pay those monies
twice.
The Restatement illustration cited by the district court and Gordon Paving on appeal does
not change this outcome and is in accordance with Compeer's position. That illustration states:
A obtains a judgment against B for $25,000. Property of B worth $35,000
is sold at execution to C, a bona fide purchaser who is otherwise a stranger to the
transaction. C is aware that B is prosecuting an appeal from A's judgment. The
sale, although properly conducted, brings only $25,000: this amount is paid to A.
A's judgment against B is subsequently reversed on appeal. B has no claim to
recover the property from C. B has a claim in restitution against A to the extent of
A's unjust enrichment. If A's actions have been in good faith, B's claim is for
$25,000 plus interest.
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Restatement § 18, illustration 9. That illustration is to show the general rule that the aggrieved
party's claim for an execution on a reversed judgment is limited to restitution plus interest. See

id., comment f. The example says nothing of execution expenses, but rather accords with the
general rule on unjust enrichment: "B has a claim in restitution against A to the extent of A's

unjust enrichment." Id. (emphasis added). Again, Compeer was not unjustly enriched by the
auction expenses it never received or immediately paid over to third parties. As this illustration
shows, Gordon Paving's claim is limited to the extent of Compeer's unjust enrichment.
In sum, Compeer simply was not unjustly enriched by the amounts it spent on auctioneer
fees and preparing the collateral for auction. Its "resulting liability in restitution" currently
"exceed[s] the net enrichment attributable to the transaction with the claimant." Restatement
§ 65, cmt. a. Therefore, the principal of the award in restitution should be reduced in the amount
of $43,747.43 for auctioneer fees and in the amount of $32,025.12 for LaserLine collateral
preparation fees, and the prejudgment interest award should be adjusted accordingly.
Finally, awarding Gordon Paving only the net proceeds is consistent with the policy of
the general proposition of the law that the court's judgment "is final until reversed in an appellate
court, or modified or set aside in the court of its rendition." Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170,
59 S.Ct. 134 (1938). If a party wants to stay execution of a final judgment pending appeal, it
should post a bond. I.A.R. 13. Gordon Paving did not post a bond and cannot complain that it
was impacted as a result of the lawful execution.

-415033518_2.doc [13058-2]

B.

The District Court's Finding That Compeer Did Not Prove the Expenses Does Not
Apply to the Auction Fees, and the Trial Exhibits and Testimony Show More Than
Sufficient Evidence of Those Fees.
Gordon Paving's argument that Compeer failed to prove its expenses is wrong on two

accounts. Idaho law is well established that all damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty. See Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 361, 386 P.3d 496,
502 (2016). Reasonable certainty does not require "absolute assurance nor mathematical
exactitude," and "there must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which
the factfinder can calculate the amount of damages." Id. (citations omitted).
First, the district court did find that Compeer failed to prove its expenses as to LaserLine.
R. at 455-57. Compeer disagrees with that finding. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-17. However,
the district court did not make that finding as to the Masters Auction Service fees (see R. at 455).
Second, even if the court had made this finding, such finding would be clearly
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Compeer's expenses related to the auctioneer fees
were more than sufficiently proven. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8 is the settlement sheet from
Masters Auction Service for its work conducting the auction. Exhibit 8 shows that the gross sales
for the October 2, 2014 auction were $279,834.50. Id. The auctioneer deducted its commission
of $41,975.18, as well as items of costs, including advertising. Id. The settlement sheet shows
that Compeer netted $236,087.07, paid in check number 18257. Id. Trial Exhibit 7, page two, is a
copy of that check from Masters Auction Service to Compeer. Trial Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 64, 1. 16p. 65, 1. 11. These exhibits show conclusively that the auctioneer fees and costs were paid
directly from the auction proceeds and that Compeer never realized these amounts.
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Therefore, the Masters Auction Service fees and costs were adequately proven, and the
district court abused its discretion by failing to act within the bounds of the applicable legal
authorities and grant Compeer an offset for these fees, as set forth in Section A, supra.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Allowing Gordon Paving to Receive the
Time-Value of Money for the Trial Delay That it Caused.
Gordon Paving is correct that the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate the

aggrieved party for the time-value of money. Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho
189, 201, 321 P.3d 739, 751 (2014) (citing Stueve v. N Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 722-23,
838 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Ct. App. 1992)).
But, it is Gordon Paving's fault that a judgment was delayed an additional seven months
due to its requested trial delay. R. at 491, p. 40, 11. 15-19 (Transcript of April 27, 2018 Motion
Hearing). It willingly chose to delay the entry of judgment and represented that Compeer would
not be prejudiced for that delay. Moreover, the delay was requested for the very purpose of
presenting an unliquidated claim-fair market value damages-to the district court. R. at 81-87.
During the summary judgment proceedings that occurred during this timeframe, Gordon Paving
continued to represent to the district court that it was entitled to unliquidated damages, not a
liquidated claim for restitution. R. at 332-35. Compeer should not be required to pay for Gordon
Paving's requested delay of the trial while it waited for a legal determination regarding whether
Compeer would be required to pay for legal damages or simply restitution. The district court did
not arrive at its decision by an exercise of reason in approving prejudgment interest for the trial
delay. Instead, it rewarded Gordon Paving for its failure to follow the scheduling order and
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failure to timely disclose its experts. Compeer therefore requests that this Court reverse the
judgment of the district court and, therefore, at the very least, suspend the running of
prejudgment interest for this time period from May 1, 2018 (the original trial date) to
December 11, 2018 (the reset trial date).

D.

Compeer Objects to Gordon Paving's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs.
Compeer objects to Gordon Paving's request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3),

because Compeer should be declared the prevailing party on appeal. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25.
Compeer further objects to Gordon Paving's request for fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Idaho Code§ 12-121 states: "attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by
the court only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in writing and include the basis and
reasons for the award." Attorney fees under section 121 are not appropriate unless "the position
advocated by the nonprevailing party is plainly fallacious and, therefore, not fairly debatable."

Assocs. Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added). Attorney fees will not be awarded for positions that are based on a good faith
argument, even if those arguments are unsuccessful. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 401,
210 P .3d 75, 86 (2009). Further, "[w ]here a case involves a novel legal question, attorney fees
should not be granted under LC. § 12-121." Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 651, 115 P.3d
731, 742 (2005); see also Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013) (declining
to award attorney fees under Section 12-121 even through much of the appellant's appeal "was
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riddled with mischaracterizations of the law and frivolous argument," since the "case presented a
novel issue" of constitutional law).
Here, Gordon Paving has presented the Court with only legal authority regarding attorney
fees and does not provide any factual argument supporting the request for fees under Idaho Code
§ 12-121, and the request should be disregarded. Ball v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 678,
273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2012) (prevailing party waived any claim to attorney fees as a result of
failing to present any argument in support of its request).
Moreover, unlike the case cited by Gordon Paving, this case does not involve the
application of well-established law, nor has Compeer asked this Court to reweigh the evidence.
This case has presented numerous issues of first impression. In particular, no Idaho case has
dealt with restitution on a reversed judgment under the Restatement; no case has dealt with the
offset of expenses on restitution on a reversed judgment, and no case has dealt with prejudgment
interest on restitution on a reversed judgment. Moreover, Compeer argued for a good faith
change in the law of prejudgment interest. Compeer further does not request that this Court
reweigh the evidence; rather, it asks this Court to review the findings of the district court for an
abuse of discretion. Therefore, fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not warranted.

III.

CONCLUSION

Compeer was not unjustly enriched by the expenses it paid for executing on the
collateral. It should not be required to pay over money to Gordon Paving that it never realized,
particularly where Gordon Paving failed to post a bond. It adequately proved these expenses with
an auction settlement sheet and auction check showing that the expenses were deducted directly
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from the check. The district court erred in awarding these amounts in restitution. This Court
should at the very least vacate the judgment to grant Compeer an offset of the auction expenses
and adjust the award of prejudgment interest accordingly. The Court should also stop the running
of prejudgment interest to avoid awarding Gordon Paving for causing a seven-month trial delay.
For these reasons, Compeer requests that the Court vacate the judgment of the district court and
direct that it amend the judgment accordingly.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Isl Bradley J. Dixon
Bradley J. Dixon
Kersti H. Kennedy
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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